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THE PROBLEM OF JURISDICTIONAL                      
NON-PRECEDENT 
Stephen I. Vladeck* 
In the aftermath of the Second World War, the federal courts—and the Supreme 
Court, in particular—repeatedly confronted the complicated legal and political questions 
arising out of the detention of enemy soldiers outside the territorial United States.1  To 
be sure, the Court had occasionally grappled with comparable questions in prior 
conflicts,2 and it had also resolved a handful of military detention cases during and 
immediately after the war.3  But the sheer number of prisoners in U.S. custody, the 
seemingly indefinite duration of the post-hostilities detention,4 and the effectively 
unprecedented use of both domestic and international military tribunals to try many of 
the detainees as war criminals,5 all combined to produce a surge of litigation, as 
                                                                                                                                               
 * Associate Professor, American University, Washington College of Law.  This article, which benefited 
from a faculty workshop at the West Virginia University College of Law, was prepared in conjunction with the 
Tulsa Law Review’s 2008–2009 Supreme Court Review (symposium discussing cases from the 2007 Supreme 
Court Term), and for my participation I owe special thanks to Mitch Berman, the guest editor.  Thanks also to 
Maureen Roach for superlative research assistance.  In the interests of full disclosure, I should note that in 
addition to serving as co-counsel at various points for the petitioner in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 
(2006), I also co-authored briefs on behalf of a group of law professors as amici curiae (in support of the 
petitioners) before the Supreme Court in Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008), and on behalf of a 
different group of law professors as amici curiae (in support of jurisdiction) in Munaf v. Geren, 128 S. Ct. 2207 
(2008).  Needless to say, the views expressed herein are mine alone. 
 1. See Charles Fairman, Some New Problems of the Constitution Following the Flag, 1 Stan. L. Rev. 587 
(1949); see also Stephen I. Vladeck, Deconstructing Hirota: Habeas Corpus, Citizenship, and Article III, 95 
Geo. L.J. 1497, 1505–11 (2007) (noting the upsurge in the number of cases the Supreme Court was asked to 
consider after the war). 
 2. Although the Court did not rule on the detention of any enemy soldiers during the First World War, its 
Civil War-era decisions in Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2 (1866), and Ex parte Vallandigham, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 
243 (1864), both involved military commission convictions of alleged Confederate agents—or, at the very 
least, Confederate sympathizers.  See also Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144, 147–48 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 
9487). 
 3. See e.g. In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 11–14 (1946); Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1942); cf. 
Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304 (1946) (rejecting the use of provost courts in Hawaii to try civilians for 
non-military offenses). 
 4. Indeed, the Court in 1948 held that detention of non-citizens under the Alien Enemy Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 
21–24, was still warranted even though formal hostilities had ceased, concluding that the war was not legally 
“over” until the political branches officially recognized as much; see Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160, 166–72 
(1948); see also U.S. ex rel. Jaegeler v. Carusi, 342 U.S. 347 (1952) (per curiam) (ordering the release of 
German enemy aliens in light of the Act of Oct. 19, 1951, Pub. L. No. 181, 65 Stat. 451 (1951), pursuant to 
which the political branches had finally declared a formal cession of hostilities). 
 5. In addition to the more famous “international” military tribunals at Nuremberg and Tokyo, the United 
States and its allies tried thousands of German and Japanese soldiers in smaller multinational and domestic 
tribunals.  See e.g. Flick v. Johnson, 174 F.2d 983, 984–85 (D.C. Cir. 1949) (describing the trials in Germany 
pursuant to Control Council Law No. 10) [hereinafter Flick I]. 
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hundreds of non-citizen detainees sought refuge in the Article III courts.6 
The questions these cases raised culminated in a pair of Supreme Court 
decisions—the Court’s terse December 1948 per curiam opinion in Hirota v. 
MacArthur,7 and its far more involved June 1950 ruling in Johnson v. Eisentrager.8  
Hirota and its companion case9 rejected jurisdiction over habeas petitions filed by 
individuals convicted by the Tokyo war crimes tribunal; Eisentrager seemed to hold, 
more broadly, that non-citizens outside the territorial United States (or, at the very least, 
“enemy” aliens) had no constitutional right to the writ of habeas corpus and were 
therefore precluded from challenging their detention and trial by military tribunal given 
the apparent absence of statutory jurisdiction over their claims.10 
Whatever the merits of the Supreme Court’s efforts in Hirota and Eisentrager, 
both formed the basis for D.C. Circuit decisions in 2007 dismissing habeas petitions 
brought by individuals in U.S. custody.  In particular, the Court of Appeals relied upon 
Eisentrager in supporting the dismissal of habeas petitions brought by non-citizens 
detained as “enemy combatants” at Guantánamo Bay.11  And a separate panel of the 
same court relied upon Hirota in supporting the dismissal of a habeas petition brought by 
a U.S. citizen held by the “Multinational Force—Iraq” (MNF—I).12 
Toward the end of its 2007 Term (and on the same day), the Supreme Court 
reversed both decisions.  In Boumediene v. Bush,13 a 5–4 majority held that the 
Guantánamo detainees have a constitutional right to habeas corpus, and that the Military 
Commissions Act of 2006,14 by stripping federal habeas corpus jurisdiction without 
providing an adequate substitute, violated that right.15  In the process, the majority 
heavily distinguished Eisentrager, with Justice Kennedy concluding that “[n]othing in 
Eisentrager says that de jure sovereignty is or has ever been the only relevant 
                                                                                                                                               
 6. Indeed, these cases were not limited to non-citizens.  The same period witnessed a flurry of habeas 
petitions brought by U.S. servicemembers detained abroad seeking to challenge their convictions by court-
martial.  See Vladeck, supra n. 1, at 1509–11.  Although their petitions raised comparable jurisdictional 
questions, the Court would ultimately sustain the jurisdiction of the federal courts over the servicemembers’ 
claims, albeit sub silentio; see id. at 1514 n. 94 (citing Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137 (1953) (plurality)). 
 7. 338 U.S. 197 (1948) (per curiam). 
 8. 339 U.S. 763 (1950) [hereinafter Eisentrager]. 
 9. See Kimura v. MacArthur, 335 U.S. 898 (1948) (mem.). 
 10. Statutory jurisdiction was arguably foreclosed by the Court’s decision in Ahrens v. Clark, 335 U.S. 188, 
189–93 (1948), which held that 28 U.S.C. § 2241 required federal detainees to pursue habeas relief in the 
district in which they were confined.  As I discuss in more detail below, the courts in Eisentrager over-read 
Ahrens, which had expressly reserved whether its holding applied to detainees held outside the jurisdiction of 
any district court.  See id. at 192 n. 4. 
 11. See Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981 (D.C. Cir. 2007), rev’d, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008). 
 12. See Munaf v. Geren, 482 F.3d 582, 583–84 (D.C. Cir. 2007), vacated, 128 S. Ct. 2207, 2212 (2008).  A 
different panel of the D.C. Circuit sustained jurisdiction over another habeas petition brought by a U.S. citizen 
detained by the MNF–I, reasoning that unlike the petitioners in Hirota, the petitioner there had not been tried 
and convicted by a foreign or international court.  See Omar v. Harvey, 479 F.3d 1, 14–15 (D.C. Cir. 2007).  
The Supreme Court consolidated Omar and Munaf in its cert. grant.  See Geren v. Omar, 128 S. Ct. 741 (2007) 
(mem.). 
 13. 128 S. Ct. 2229. 
 14. Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (2006) (codified in scattered sections of 10, 18, and 28 U.S.C.). 
 15. Although my focus here is on the Court’s first holding—i.e., that the Suspension Clause “has full effect 
at Guantanamo,” Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2262—I elsewhere take up this other central aspect of Justice 
Kennedy’s analysis, and his argument for why the MCA failed to provide an adequate alternative to habeas 
corpus.  See Stephen I. Vladeck, Boumediene’s Quiet Theory: Access to Courts and the Separation of Powers, 
84 Notre Dame L. Rev. (forthcoming 2009) (copy on file with Notre Dame Law Review). 
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consideration in determining the geographic reach of the Constitution or of habeas 
corpus.”16  To the contrary, the Boumediene Court endorsed a functional approach to the 
resolution of whether particular constitutional provisions apply extraterritorially, a 
methodology that is necessarily circumstance-specific.17 
And in Munaf v. Geren,18 the Court unanimously reversed the D.C. Circuit’s 
conclusion in the Munaf case that Hirota precluded the exercise of federal habeas 
jurisdiction over a U.S. citizen in the custody of the MNF—I, with Chief Justice Roberts 
reasoning that the facts of Hirota were easily distinguishable, and that, as such, “[t]hat 
slip of a case cannot bear the weight the Government would place on it.”19  Although the 
Court went on to hold that the substantive claims at issue were without merit,20 it 
devoted scarcely two pages to the jurisdictional issue that had preoccupied—and 
squarely divided—the lower courts. 
It is tempting to cast the difference between Hirota and Eisentrager on one hand 
and Munaf and Boumediene on the other in generational terms.  The earlier pair came in 
the context of the greatest military conflict the world has ever seen, and each case 
threatened to challenge not just the ordinary functioning of the Article III courts, but, 
more fundamentally, the emerging corpus of international criminal law that the United 
States was instrumental in creating.  In contrast, the later pair came in the context of 
increasingly unpopular military conflicts conducted by an increasingly unpopular 
President, whose Administration had arguably missed signals the Court had tried to send 
in four earlier decisions in related cases.21  One might also see Boumediene (and, to a 
lesser degree, Munaf) in political terms—as coming on the far side of the “rights” 
revolution, and as resulting from a Court far more concerned about the possibility of 
legal black holes than its predecessors.22 
But whatever the influence of these considerations, my own view is that the 
                                                                                                                                               
 16. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2258. 
 17. For a thoughtful discussion of Boumediene’s potential implications for other constitutional provisions, 
see Gerald L. Neuman, The Extraterritorial Constitution after Boumediene v. Bush, 82 S. Cal. L. Rev. 259 
(2009).  Although anything more than a cursory discussion of Boumediene’s impact on successive litigation is 
beyond the scope of this article, it bears mentioning that the lower courts have thus far been somewhat reticent 
to extend other constitutional protections to the Guantánamo detainees.  See e.g. Kiyemba v. Obama, 555 F.3d 
1022 (D.C. Cir. 2009), petition for cert. filed, 77 U.S.L.W. 3577 (U.S. Apr. 2, 2009).  However, the Supreme 
Court may have sent its own signal in December 2008 by vacating (in light of Boumediene) a D.C. Circuit 
decision dismissing a damages lawsuit arising out allegations of torture at Guantánamo and remanding for 
further proceedings.  See Rasul v. Myers, 512 F.3d 644 (D.C. Cir. 2008), vacated, 129 S. Ct. 763 (2008) 
[hereinafter Myers].  But see Rasul v. Myers, 563 F.3d 527 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (reaffirming original decision on 
remand). 
 18. 128 S. Ct. 2207, 2228. 
 19. Id. at 2217. 
 20. See id. at 2218–28.  The decision to reach the merits was surprising, given that the lower courts had 
only decided the jurisdictional question. 
 21. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (plurality); 
Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004) [hereinafter Rasul]; Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004).  For more on 
the idea of missed signals, see Stephen I. Vladeck, Book Review: The Long War, the Federal Courts, and the 
Necessity/Legality Paradox, 43 U. Rich. L. Rev. 893, 910–13 (2009) (reviewing Ben Wittes, Law and the Long 
War: The Future of Justice in the Age of Terror (Penguin Group 2008)). 
 22. Indeed, one particularly harsh criticism of Boumediene characterized the decision as a product of the 
“culture wars,” akin to the Court’s decisions in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), and Griswold v. 
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).  See Richard Klingler, The Court, the Culture Wars, and Real Wars, 30 
ABA Natl. Sec. L. Rpt. 1 (June 2008). 
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atmospherics of the cases only go so far in explaining why Hirota and Eisentrager 
proved so easy for the Court in Munaf and Boumediene to distinguish, rather than 
overrule.  After all, if both decisions created the categorical preclusions of federal 
jurisdiction suggested by the government and embraced by the D.C. Circuit, it should 
have been much harder to get around them. 
Instead, this article suggests that there is another critical distinction between the 
earlier and later cases that helps explain why both World War II-era decisions proved 
such flimsy precedents: the relationship between the jurisdictional rules they purported to 
create and the merits.  Although Hirota and Eisentrager both suggested that they were 
relying on principles wholly unrelated to the merits of the petitioners’ claims, a closer 
reading of the opinions (and of the Justices’ papers) reveals that the rules the Court 
created were incredibly fact-bound, turning as much on the Justices’ conclusion that the 
detainees were bound to lose on the merits as on their conclusion that the courts would 
lack the power to rule to the contrary either way. 
In that regard, both Hirota and Eisentrager manifest a kind of analytical 
methodology that is no longer in vogue, as reflected, inter alia, in the Supreme Court’s 
1998 decision in Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment.23  There, the Court 
forcefully rejected the doctrine of “hypothetical jurisdiction,” reasoning instead that the 
Article III courts have no power to assume the existence of jurisdiction in order to reach 
the merits.24  Steel Co. thus presaged a kind of “jurisdictional formalism,”25 pursuant to 
which the lower federal courts have had to demonstrate far greater care in distinguishing 
“jurisdictional” holdings from decisions on the merits—a teaching the Supreme Court 
has had to reinforce repeatedly in the decade since Steel Co. was handed down.26 
My thesis, then, is that Hirota and Eisentrager are relics of the pre-Steel Co. era, 
when “jurisdictional” rules were far more likely to be intensely fact-bound than they are 
today.  In that sense, the cases are almost “non-precedent,”27 because it will be 
                                                                                                                                               
 23. 523 U.S. 83 (1998). 
 24. See id. at 94–96, 101 (“Hypothetical jurisdiction produces nothing more than a hypothetical judgment—
which comes to the same thing as an advisory opinion, disapproved by this Court from the beginning. . . .  
Much more than legal niceties are at stake here.  The statutory and (especially) constitutional elements of 
jurisdiction are an essential ingredient of separation and equilibration of powers, restraining the courts from 
acting at certain times, and even restraining them from acting permanently regarding certain subjects.” 
(citations omitted)). 
 25. Useful academic discussions of such an approach abound.  See Laura S. Fitzgerald, Is Jurisdiction 
Jurisdictional? 95 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1207, 1214–17 (2001); Jack H. Friedenthal, The Crack in the Steel Case, 68 
Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 258, 269–73 (2000); Scott C. Idleman, The Emergence of Jurisdictional Resequencing in 
the Federal Courts, 87 Cornell L. Rev. 1 (2001); Joshua Schwartz, Student Author, Limiting Steel Co.: 
Recapturing a Broader “Arising under” Jurisdictional Question, 104 Colum. L. Rev. 2255 (2004). 
 26. Aside from cases where the Court has specifically addressed the order of decision making required by 
Steel Co. (see e.g. Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malaysia Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 430–31 (2007); Ruhrgas 
AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 583–88 (1999); see also Tenet v. Doe, 544 U.S. 1, 6 n. 4 (2005)), the 
Court has also devoted a number of opinions in recent terms to the question of whether particular rules are, in 
fact, “jurisdictional.”  See e.g. Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500 (2006); Eberhart v. U.S., 546 U.S. 12 
(2005) (per curiam); Scarborough v. Principi, 541 U.S. 401 (2004); Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443 (2004).  
For a summary of the relevant considerations, see Howard M. Wasserman, Jurisdiction and Merits, 80 Wash. 
L. Rev. 643 (2005). 
 27. The term “anti-precedent” (or “anti-canonical”) is often used to describe judicial decisions that come to 
be cited only to prove the now-accepted incorrectness of their holding—cases like Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 
537 (1896), Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), and Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).  
See e.g. Michael R. Dimino, The Futile Quest for a System of Judicial “Merit” Selection, 67 Alb. L. Rev. 803, 
803–04 n. 3 (2004).  I use “non-precedent,” in contrast, to indicate the uselessness of a particular precedent, 
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remarkably easy to distinguish them on anything short of entirely parallel facts.  And 
although Munaf and Boumediene are particularly prominent exemplars of this idea, my 
thesis cuts more broadly, suggesting that we have yet to fully appreciate the impact of 
Steel Co. on pre-Steel Co. precedent, especially those instances where the courts 
conflated a jurisdictional defect with its analysis of the merits.28 
To unpack this argument, Part I begins with Hirota and Eisentrager, and the 
complicated series of cases forerunning the Supreme Court’s twin decisions.  As Part I 
suggests, at least some of the Justices thought there might be merit to some of the claims 
brought by other non-citizens detained overseas and so were careful to argue in favor of 
a merits-based jurisdictional holding in both cases—that is, a holding that could be read 
to rest the absence of jurisdiction on the lack of merit to those particular detainees’ 
claims.  In Part II, I turn to Steel Co. and its aftermath and summarize the impact that the 
Court’s decision has had on “jurisdictional” rules in the decade since it was handed 
down. 
Finally, Part III focuses on the lower-court decisions in Munaf and Boumediene 
and the Supreme Court’s justifications for effectively doing away with Hirota and 
Eisentrager.  What is particularly telling about the relationship between Boumediene and 
Eisentrager is the extent to which most external criticisms of Justice Kennedy’s opinion 
have centered on the charge leveled throughout Justice Scalia’s dissent, i.e., that the 
decision is unfaithful to Eisentrager.29  As I conclude, though, these critiques miss the 
significance of the methodological shift that Steel Co. may not have caused, but of which 
it is emblematic.  There may be flaws in Justice Kennedy’s analysis, but a lack of fidelity 
to precedent simply is not one of them. 
I. HIROTA AND EISENTRAGER 
As one student commentator observed in 1951, “the exercise of criminal 
jurisdiction over aliens by American institutions abroad applying American law [was] 
indeed a rather peculiar phenomenon of the post-World War II period.”30  With the 
                                                                                                                                               
rather than its complete inversion.  A more familiar example might be decisions that explicitly limit themselves 
to their facts and that, therefore, become all-but impossible to rely upon as controlling authority in future 
litigation.  See e.g. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (per curiam); Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 
(1981). 
 28. To be clear, Steel Co. has no bearing on those rare cases where the existence of jurisdiction merges with 
the merits, as is true, for example, for writs of mandamus under 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (2006).  See e.g. In re 
Cheney, 406 F.3d 723, 729 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (en banc).  Similarly, the Supreme Court has noted that a “‘serious 
constitutional question’ . . . would arise if a federal statute were construed to deny any judicial forum for a 
colorable constitutional claim.”  Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 603 (1988) (citations omitted).  The natural 
implication is that whether the constitutional claim is colorable may affect whether the deprivation of a judicial 
forum is constitutional, and in such cases, too, the merits and the jurisdictional question merge.  My target here, 
though, is cases in which the questions do not merge analytically, but rather are conflated only descriptively. 
 29. See e.g. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2298–99 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Eisentrager thus held—held 
beyond any doubt—that the Constitution does not ensure habeas for aliens held by the United States in areas 
over which our Government is not sovereign.” (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted)); id. at 2302 (“By 
blatantly distorting Eisentrager, the Court avoids the difficulty of explaining why it should be overruled.”); see 
also id. at 2299 n. 3 (referring to the majority’s “failed attempt to distinguish Eisentrager”); id. at 2299 
(describing the majority’s description of Eisentrager as a “sheer rewriting of the case”); id. at 2300 
(“Eisentrager nowhere mentions a ‘functional’ test, and the notion that it is based upon such a principle is 
patently false.”).  For the external critics, see sources cited infra note 162. 
 30. Douglas E. Dayton, Student Author, A Critique of the Eisentrager Case: American Law Abroad—
Habeas Corpus at Home? 36 Cornell L.Q. 303, 330 (1951). 
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tremendous proliferation of war crimes prosecutions in the post-war years came 
challenging questions about the legality and fairness of such proceedings—and, as a 
threshold matter, whether any American civilian court could properly sit in judgment 
thereof.  And if those questions were not complex enough, many of the applications for 
relief were filed directly in the Supreme Court, raising separate but equally challenging 
questions about the Court’s jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus as an “original” 
rather than “appellate” manner.31 
A. Ahrens 
It was against this backdrop that the Court decided Ahrens v. Clark32 on June 21, 
1948, the last day of its 1947 Term.33  In Ahrens, the Court held that the federal habeas 
corpus statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2241, required petitioners to seek relief in the federal district 
court for the territory in which they were confined, even if another district court could 
also exercise jurisdiction over the petitioner’s custodian.  Writing for a 6–3 majority, 
Justice Douglas explained that  
the view that the jurisdiction of the District Court to issue the writ in cases such as this is 
restricted to those petitioners who are confined or detained within the territorial jurisdiction 
of the court is supported by the language of the statute, by considerations of policy, and by 
the legislative history of the enactment.34 
Douglas’s opinion was careful to characterize its result as venue-driven.  Thus, 
“[w]e need not determine the question of what process, if any, a person confined in an 
area not subject to the jurisdiction of any district court may employ to assert federal 
rights.”35  Nevertheless, contemporary commentators viewed Ahrens’s logic as 
extending to those cases, as well—and as foreclosing jurisdiction.36  Just over three 
months after Ahrens, when 21 German nationals convicted of war crimes by a U.S. 
military tribunal in China and detained at Landsberg Prison in Germany sought to 
challenge their convictions through a federal habeas petition,37 the U.S. District Court 
                                                                                                                                               
 31. See e.g. Dallin H. Oaks, The “Original” Writ of Habeas Corpus in the Supreme Court, 1962 S. Ct. Rev. 
153; see also Vladeck, supra n. 1, at 1511–15. 
 32. 335 U.S. 188. 
 33. More than just a critical starting point for the doctrinal evolution charted herein, Ahrens is also 
fascinating for the role played in it by Justice Stevens, then a law clerk for Justice Rutledge (and, apparently, 
the principal author of Rutledge’s dissent in the same case).  See Joseph T. Thai, The Law Clerk Who Wrote 
Rasul v. Bush: John Paul Stevens’s Influence from World War II to the War on Terror, 92 Va. L. Rev. 501 
(2006); see also Laura Krugman Ray, Clerk and Justice: The Ties That Bind John Paul Stevens and Wiley B. 
Rutledge, 41 Conn. L. Rev. 211 (2008). 
 34. Ahrens, 335 U.S. at 192 (footnote omitted). 
 35. Id. at 192 n. 4.  Tellingly, Douglas cited as examples the “original” habeas petitions in war crimes cases 
that the Court had disposed of during the 1946 term.  See id.; see also Vladeck, supra n. 1, at 1509–11 
(discussing these cases). 
 36. See Fairman, supra n. 1, at 632 (“[I]f the statute makes the presence of the petitioner a requisite to 
jurisdiction, how can it make any difference whether the detention is in no district rather than in a different 
district?” (emphasis in original)); see also Developments in the Law—Federal Habeas Corpus, 83 Harv. L. 
Rev. 1038, 1163 n. 54 (1970) (“[I]f Ahrens is based on the power of a court to act it is hard to see what 
difference it should make to the court’s power that the petitioner has no alternative forum.”). 
 37. The record suggests that the petitioners were all civilian employees of the German government in China 
although there is some dispute as to whether they were employed by the German military or not.  See 
Eisentrager v. Forrestal, 174 F.2d 961, 962 n. 3 (D.C. Cir. 1949) [hereinafter Forrestal]; see also Eisentrager, 
339 U.S. at 765.  The petitioners were charged and convicted for war crimes for continuing to support the 
VLADECK FINAL FOR PRINT3 6/25/2009  7:28 PM 
2009] THE PROBLEM OF JURISDICTIONAL NON-PRECEDENT 593 
for the District of Columbia cursorily dismissed their claims for want of statutory 
jurisdiction, citing only Ahrens in support.38  The question Ahrens sought to reserve was 
thus squarely decided, raising the related question of whether such preclusion of 
jurisdiction created any constitutional problems.39 
B. Hirota 
Seven weeks after the district court’s decision in Eisentrager, the Supreme Court 
was confronted with perhaps the most vexing application for original habeas relief that it 
had yet received in a war crimes case—from seven of the “Class A” defendants before 
the Tokyo war crimes tribunal, formally the International Military Tribunal for the Far 
East (IMTFE).  Although each of the petitioners raised a host of challenges to the 
jurisdiction and procedures of the tribunal, the lead plaintiff—Kōki Hirota—presented a 
unique set of claims, both because he was a civilian and because he had retired from 
public service in the mid-1930s, well before the escalation of hostilities in the Pacific 
theater. 
The unique facts of Hirota’s case were made clear to the rest of the Court by 
Justice Rutledge.  Apparently believing the Court was about to refuse to set Hirota’s 
application for argument (as it had done in all of the previous “original” war crimes 
cases), Rutledge circulated a harshly worded draft dissent that he would file from such a 
denial: 
If the Yamashita and Homma[40] cases determined, as I thought, that enemy belligerents 
have none of our constitutional protections, it does not follow that they held enemy 
civilians to occupy the same denuded status.  Nor has this Court yet decided that such 
persons or others, including our own citizens, but exceptions [sic] perhaps enemy 
combatants, having access to no inferior court, can have no remedy for reviewing action by 
an American military tribunal in disregard of all constitutional limitations or like action of 
any such tribunal in which our officials may participate. 
 For me the applications set forth serious challenges to the validity of the Tribunal’s 
constitution and jurisdiction.  Thereby in turn they raise grave questions concerning this 
Court’s power to set [sic] in review of what has been done.  If the Tribunal is in fact a 
validly constituted international one, presumably its action is beyond our reach.  If it is in 
fact a political body, exercising power under forms of legal procedure strange to our 
institutions and traditions, established wholly or in part by the political departments of our 
                                                                                                                                               
Japanese military in China after Germany’s surrender on May 8, 1945.  Id. 
 38. Eisentrager v. Forrestal, unpublished opinion (D.D.C. Oct. 6, 1948) (reprinted in Transcript of Record 
at 16-17, Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (No. 306)). 
 39. See Stephen I. Vladeck, The Suspension Clause as a Structural Right, 62 U. Miami L. Rev. 275, 294 
(2008) (“Ahrens thus forced the issue that the Supreme Court had otherwise been able to avoid . . . .  If the 
habeas statute did not itself authorize jurisdiction over petitions filed by detainees held outside the jurisdiction 
of any district court . . ., then the question whether the statute so construed would violate the Suspension Clause 
was thrust to the forefront.” (footnote omitted)). 
 40. In In re Homma, 327 U.S. 759 (1946) (mem.), the Court declined to hear a challenge to the military 
commission conviction of the Japanese officer responsible for the Bataan Death Match, relying on its decision 
one week earlier in In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946).  Justices Murphy and Rutledge dissented from the 
denial of leave to file, though, arguing that Homma’s case raised questions distinct from—and not resolved 
by—Yamashita’s.  See Homma, 327 U.S. at 759–61 (Murphy, J., dissenting); id. at 761–63 (Rutledge, J., 
dissenting). 
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Government by action our judicial institutions have no authority or power to check, the 
same consequences must follow.  These consequences however are not for me either self-
evident or frivolous matters, to be decided without hearing or argument.41 
Unlike the prior war crimes cases, though, where Justice Jackson had been forced 
to recuse himself because of his role as chief prosecutor at Nuremberg, he was able to 
break the 4–4 deadlock over whether Hirota should be set for argument.  And although 
he was quite ambivalent about the Court’s power to decide the questions presented, 
Jackson voted to break the tie in favor of hearing argument, issuing a rare concurrence 
explaining his decision.42 
Argument, however, failed to persuade a majority of the Justices that the Court had 
the power to reach the merits.  Instead, a 6–143 Court held in a terse per curiam opinion 
that it lacked jurisdiction to entertain the petitioners’ claims: 
 We are satisfied that the tribunal sentencing these petitioners is not a tribunal of the 
United States.  The United States and other allied countries conquered and now occupy and 
control Japan.  General Douglas MacArthur has been selected and is acting as the Supreme 
Commander for the Allied Powers.  The military tribunal sentencing these petitioners has 
been set up by General MacArthur as the agent of the Allied Powers. 
 Under the foregoing circumstances the courts of the United States have no power or 
authority to review, to affirm, set aside or annul the judgments and sentences imposed on 
these petitioners and for this reason the motions for leave to file petitions for writs of 
habeas corpus are denied.44 
Unfortunately, the Court’s short opinion raised more questions than it answered.  
Other than its allusion to “the foregoing circumstances,” the opinion did not specify why 
“‘the courts of the United States have no power or authority to review, to affirm, set 
aside or annul the judgments and sentences imposed on these petitioners.’”45  Was the 
jurisdictional defect based upon the Supreme Court’s lack of original jurisdiction (in 
which case the same claims could be brought in the lower federal courts), or on a defect 
in all federal jurisdiction?  Contemporary courts and commentators assumed that the 
Court had reached the latter (broader) holding,46 even though the narrower ground was 
arguably available.47 
And which “circumstances” were so central to the Court’s analysis?  Did it matter, 
for example, that the petitioners in Hirota were all non-citizens, even though neither the 
                                                                                                                                               
 41. Draft Opinion of Justice Rutledge 3-4 (Dec. 6, 1948) (on file with the Lib. of Cong., Ms. Div., Papers of 
Wiley Rutledge, Container 168, Hirota v. MacArthur Case File) (quoted in Vladeck, supra n. 1, at 1516). 
 42. See Hirota v. MacArthur, 335 U.S. 876 (1948) (mem.) (Jackson, J.). 
 43. Although the vote was 6–1, Justice Douglas’s post-hoc concurrence was arguably only in the judgment, 
since he would have held that the petitioners’ claims raised a political question and not that the Court lacked 
subject-matter jurisdiction.  See Hirota, 338 U.S. at 204–15 (Douglas, J., concurring).  Otherwise, Justice 
Murphy dissented without opinion.  Justice Rutledge reserved his vote (although he died over a year later 
without ever expressing a view), and Justice Jackson, whose vote was no longer necessary, declined to 
participate in the final decision.  See id. at 198–99; see also Vladeck, supra n. 1, at 1517–18 nn. 105–06. 
 44. Hirota, 338 U.S. at 198 (per curiam). 
  45. See generally id. at 203. 
 46. See e.g. Flick I, 174 F.2d 983 (applying Hirota in the lower courts to dismiss a habeas petition 
challenging a conviction by a military tribunal in Germany that was “international in character”); see also 
Hirota, 338 U.S. at 201 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
 47. See e.g. Munaf, 128 S. Ct. at 2218 n. 3 (2008). 
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habeas statute nor the relevant provisions of Article III seemed to draw any distinctions 
based upon citizenship?  Justice Douglas, who filed his “concurrence” in Hirota over six 
months after the per curiam opinion was released, believed that the Court’s opinion did 
not distinguish between citizen and non-citizen petitioners and that this was a crucial 
defect in the majority’s analysis.48 
Similarly, was it significant that the tribunal the petitioners sought to challenge 
was at least officially a multinational—as opposed to distinctly American—enterprise?  
One of the most significant early implementations of the Hirota decision saw its holding 
in precisely those terms, with the D.C. Circuit distinguishing the Eisentrager case (where 
there was no question that the tribunal was a wholly American enterprise)49 from the 
tribunals convened under Control Council Law No. 10.50 
Whatever the significance of each of these factors, the one point that is clear is that 
the Hirota Court’s lack of clarity was deliberate.  According to the Conference notes of 
Justices Douglas, Jackson, and Rutledge, Justice Black—who, given the unclear 
intentions of Justice Douglas, provided the key fifth vote for the majority’s rationale—
insisted on ambiguity and terseness.51 
C. Eisentrager 
Less than two months after Hirota came down, the D.C. Circuit heard argument in 
Eisentrager, on appeal from the district court’s dismissal for lack of jurisdiction under 
Ahrens.  Two months later, it reversed concluding that “any person deprived of his 
liberty by an official of the United States Government in violation of constitutional 
prohibitions, has a substantive right to a writ of habeas corpus,”52 the Court of Appeals 
found it immaterial that the habeas statute, under Ahrens, appeared to deprive the 
petitioners of access to the federal courts.  Instead, “if the case presented by these 
appellants arises under the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States, as it clearly 
does, jurisdiction to entertain it is in some district court by compulsion of the 
Constitution itself.”53  Thus, although the D.C. Circuit could have simply reversed on the 
ground that Ahrens only reserved the jurisdictional question there at issue, the court 
instead rested its holding on a sweeping conception of habeas corpus—as extending to 
anyone, anywhere, who alleges that their detention is “in violation of constitutional 
prohibitions.”54 
By a 6–3 vote, the Supreme Court overturned the D.C. Circuit’s decision.55  And 
                                                                                                                                               
 48. See e.g. Hirota, 338 U.S. at 204–05 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
 49. See Forrestal, 174 F.2d at 963 n. 4 (D.C. Cir. 1949). 
 50. See Flick I, 174 F.2d at 986; see also Note, Habeas Corpus Protection against Illegal Extraterritorial 
Detention, 51 Colum. L. Rev. 368, 369 n. 8 (1951).  To be sure, the D.C. Circuit’s reasoning in Flick was 
hardly beyond question.  See e.g. Review of International Criminal Convictions, 59 Yale L.J. 997, 1001–03 
(1950).  But over Justice Black’s dissent, the Supreme Court denied certiorari to review the Court of Appeals’s 
dubious application of Hirota—and on the same day it granted certiorari in Eisentrager.  See Flick v. Johnson, 
338 U.S. 879 (1949) (mem.) [hereinafter Flick II]. 
 51. See Vladeck, supra n. 1, at 1518 n. 107. 
 52. Forrestal, 174 F.2d at 965. 
 53. Id. at 966. 
 54. Id. at 967. 
 55. See Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763. 
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although Justice Jackson’s opinion for the Eisentrager majority was emphatic, it was 
hardly a model—especially for Jackson—of analytical clarity.56  After reciting the facts 
and the procedural posture, Jackson concluded his introduction by noting that “[w]e are 
cited to no instance where a court, in this or any other country where the writ is known, 
has issued it on behalf of an alien enemy who, at no relevant time and in no stage of his 
captivity, has been within its territorial jurisdiction.”57  Thus, “[t]he breadth of the [D.C. 
Circuit’s] premises and solution requires us to consider questions basic to alien enemy 
and kindred litigation which for some years have been beating upon our doors.”58 
Jackson divided his opinion for the Eisentrager majority into five distinct parts 
(although Part V merely stated the majority’s conclusion and judgment).  In Part I, 
Jackson thoroughly traced two sets of distinctions traditionally drawn by American law: 
the myriad of differences in the legal status of citizens and non-citizens, and, within the 
latter class, the distinction between “friendly” and “enemy” aliens.  For non-citizens, 
Jackson wrote, the critical point was that constitutional protections derived from their 
physical presence within the territorial jurisdiction of the U.S. courts, and not a broader 
obligation owed to them by the U.S. government.59  And “[s]ince most cases involving 
aliens afford this ground of jurisdiction, and the civil and property rights of immigrants 
or transients of foreign nationality so nearly approach equivalence to those of citizens, 
courts in peace time have little occasion to inquire whether litigants before them are alien 
or citizen.”60 
In time of war, Jackson continued, the calculus changes, because a critical 
distinction must be drawn between aliens who owe allegiance to an ally of the United 
States and those who adhere to our belligerent enemies.  Invoking the Alien Enemy Act 
as support,61 Jackson noted that “[e]xecutive power over enemy aliens, undelayed and 
unhampered by litigation, has been deemed, throughout our history, essential to war-time 
security.”62  And although various U.S. courts had historically recognized a limited 
ability of alien enemies to resort to the judicial process, Jackson concluded Part I by 
noting that those cases involved resident enemy aliens, as opposed to nonresident aliens 
such as the detainees.63  The latter class of individuals, Jackson wrote, had never been 
entitled, under British or American law, to pursue relief in the courts of their enemies.64 
Having surveyed precedent in Part I, Jackson turned to practical considerations in 
Part II.  He began by noting what it would mean if the Court affirmed the D.C. Circuit’s 
sweeping analysis: 
                                                                                                                                               
 56. The idiosyncrasies of Justice Jackson’s published opinion in Eisentrager were also present throughout 
his drafts.  Indeed, the final version differed substantively only in minor ways from Jackson’s initial (and 
uncirculated) type-set draft, dated May 20.  See Draft Opinion of Justice Jackson (May 20, 1950) (on file with 
the Lib. of Cong. Ms. Div., Papers of Robert H. Jackson, Container 163, Folder 7, Johnson v. Eisentrager Case 
File) [hereinafter “Draft Eisentrager Opinion”]. 
 57. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 768. 
 58. Id. 
 59. See id. at 770–71. 
 60. Id. at 771. 
 61. See Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 773–75. 
 62. Id. at 774. 
 63. See id. at 776. 
 64. See id. at 776–77. 
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[W]e must hold that a prisoner of our military authorities is constitutionally entitled to the 
writ, even though he (a) is an enemy alien; (b) has never been or resided in the United 
States; (c) was captured outside of our territory and there held in military custody as a 
prisoner of war; (d) was tried and convicted by a Military Commission sitting outside the 
United States; (e) for offenses against laws of war committed outside the United States; (f) 
and is at all times imprisoned outside the United States.65 
Then, he turned to the myriad of practical and logistical difficulties that would 
result from allowing the D.C. Circuit’s reasoning to stand: 
To grant the writ to these prisoners might mean that our army must transport them across 
the seas for hearing.  This would require allocation of shipping space, guarding personnel, 
billeting and rations.  It might also require transportation for whatever witnesses the 
prisoners desired to call as well as transportation for those necessary to defend legality of 
the sentence.  The writ, since it is held to be a matter of right, would be equally available to 
enemies during active hostilities as in the present twilight between war and peace.  Such 
trials would hamper the war effort and bring aid and comfort to the enemy.  They would 
diminish the prestige of our commanders, not only with enemies but with wavering 
neutrals.  It would be difficult to devise more effective fettering of a field commander than 
to allow the very enemies he is ordered to reduce to submission to call him to account in 
his own civil courts and divert his efforts and attention from the military offensive abroad 
to the legal defensive at home.  Nor is it unlikely that the result of such enemy litigiousness 
would be a conflict between judicial and military opinion highly comforting to enemies of 
the United States.66 
After emphasizing the practical considerations cutting against the D.C. Circuit’s 
view, Jackson then turned to the two precedents on which the detainees relied—Ex parte 
Quirin67 and In re Yamashita68—and explained why they were inapposite.69  In 
concluding Part II, Jackson noted (perhaps counter-intuitively) that “the doors of our 
courts have not been summarily closed upon these prisoners,”70 suggesting that three 
courts (presumably, the district court, D.C. Circuit, and Supreme Court) had considered 
“why they should not be subject to the usual disabilities of non-resident enemy aliens.”71  
But, 
[a]fter hearing all contentions they have seen fit to advance and considering every 
contention we can base on their application and the holdings below, we arrive at the same 
conclusion the Court reached in each of these cases [Quirin, Yamashita, and Hirota], viz.: 
that no right to the writ of habeas corpus appears.72 
Had Jackson stopped there, there might have been less confusion over what 
Eisentrager actually held.  Based on the analysis in Parts I and II alone, Jackson’s 
opinion could reasonably have been understood, at bottom, to deny to all enemy aliens 
outside the territorial United States a constitutional right to habeas corpus.  But Jackson 
                                                                                                                                               
 65. Id. at 777. 
 66. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 778–79. 
 67. 317 U.S. 1. 
 68. 327 U.S. 1. 
 69. See Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 779–81. 
 70. Id. at 780. 
 71. Id. at 781. 
 72. Id. 
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did not stop there.  Instead, his opinion turned in Part III to the merits of the detainees’ 
claims, especially the argument that they could not properly be subjected to military 
jurisdiction.  Emphasizing that the Fifth Amendment squarely exempts American 
military personnel from such protection, and that even resident alien enemies are entitled 
to a judicial hearing only to determine the relevant jurisdictional fact—i.e., that they are 
in fact alien enemies—Jackson concluded that “the Constitution does not confer a right 
of personal security or an immunity from military trial and punishment upon an alien 
enemy engaged in the hostile service of a government at war with the United States.”73 
Having dispensed in Part III with the claim that the detainees could not be 
subjected to military trial, Jackson turned in Part IV to the second part of the detainees’ 
case on the merits—that even if they were properly subject to military jurisdiction in the 
abstract, the tribunal in which they were convicted lacked jurisdiction.74  After briefly 
rehashing (and implicitly rejecting) the detainees’ argument that their underlying conduct 
was not a war crime, Jackson turned to the jurisdiction of the commission.75  First, 
Jackson dismissed the argument that the United States had no authority to convene a 
military commission in China, holding that the President surely had the power to station 
troops there, and that, even if China objected, “China’s grievance does not become these 
prisoners’ right.”76  Jackson then rejected the contention that anything in the 1929 
Geneva Convention precluded the assertion of military jurisdiction, noting in a footnote 
that “[r]ights of alien enemies are vindicated under it only through protests and 
intervention of protecting powers as the rights of our citizens against foreign 
governments are vindicated only by Presidential intervention.”77 
Finally, Jackson dismissed the two potential procedural irregularities that might 
have undermined the tribunal’s jurisdiction.  The first issue (concerning the Geneva 
Convention’s requirement of pre-trial notice to the protecting power) had already been 
resolved against the detainees, he reasoned, by Quirin and Yamashita.78  As to the 
second—that the tribunal’s procedures were not sufficiently comparable to those used in 
court-martial proceedings—Jackson observed that “no prejudicial disparity is pointed out 
as between the Commission that tried prisoners and those that would try an offending 
soldier of the American forces of like rank.”79  In any event, though, he concluded that 
                                                                                                                                               
 73. Id. at 785.  This holding is often mischaracterized as denying any due process rights to “alien enemies” 
outside the territorial United States.  A closer read of Part III of Jackson’s opinion, though, makes clear that he 
was addressing only whether the Due Process Clause barred the subjection of alien enemies to military 
jurisdiction—and not whether, as a categorical matter, it did not apply. 
 74. See id. at 785–86.  It was well-established by 1950 that the Article III courts could inquire into the 
jurisdiction of a military tribunal and could grant relief where it concluded that the military proceeding was 
ultra vires.  See e.g. Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 8 (“If the military tribunals have lawful authority to hear, decide 
and condemn, their action is not subject to judicial review merely because they have made a wrong decision on 
disputed facts.  Correction of their errors of decision is not for the courts but for the military authorities which 
are alone authorized to review their decisions.”); see also In re Grimley, 137 U.S. 147, 150 (1890) (“[T]he civil 
courts exercise no supervisory or correcting power over the proceedings of a court-martial . . . .  The single 
inquiry, the test, is jurisdiction.”). 
 75. See Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 786–88. 
 76. Id. at 789. 
 77. Id. at 789 n. 14. 
 78. See id. at 789–90. 
 79. Id. at 790. 
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any such protection applied to trials for disciplinary offenses, and not for war crimes.80  
Thus, “[w]e are unable to find that the petition alleges any fact showing lack of 
jurisdiction in the military authorities to accuse, try and condemn these prisoners or that 
they acted in excess of their lawful powers.”81 
What, then, did Eisentrager actually hold?  Or, put another way, which facts were 
central to the holding, whatever it was?  Was Eisentrager merely a rule about enemy 
aliens, convicted by a military tribunal (that properly exercised jurisdiction), who did not 
contest their status as such?  Was it a rule about all enemy aliens outside the territorial 
jurisdiction of the United States?  Was it a rule about all aliens outside that jurisdiction?  
Was it a rule about the Suspension Clause?  Was it a rule about the Fifth Amendment?82 
One thing is clear: The dissenters—Black, Douglas, and Burton—had no idea.  
Instead, their opinion, per Justice Black, tried to underscore the irony of Jackson’s 
analysis in Parts III and IV, given the apparently jurisdictional nature of the holding in 
Part II: 
[T]he Court apparently bases its holding that the District Court was without jurisdiction on 
its own conclusion that the petition for habeas corpus failed to show facts authorizing the 
relief prayed for.  But jurisdiction of a federal district court does not depend on whether the 
initial pleading sufficiently states a cause of action; if a court has jurisdiction of subject 
matter and parties, it should proceed to try the case, beginning with consideration of the 
pleadings.  Therefore Part IV of the opinion is wholly irrelevant and lends no support 
whatever to the Court’s holding that the District Court was without jurisdiction.83 
Notwithstanding its assertion that the analysis of the merits was irrelevant to 
ascertaining the district court’s jurisdiction, Black’s dissent left open the possibility that 
the rule Eisentrager enunciated may have turned on the “gratuitous conclusions” in Part 
IV.84  Nonetheless, the dissenters warned that “the Court’s opinion inescapably denies 
courts power to afford the least bit of protection for any alien who is subject to our 
occupation government abroad, even if he is neither enemy nor belligerent and even after 
peace is officially declared.”85 
The lack of clarity as to Eisentrager’s holding was magnified by the lack of 
opportunities in the ensuing years to clarify its scope.  In a series of cases decided during 
the 1950s, the Court distinguished Eisentrager in cases involving U.S. citizens, 
                                                                                                                                               
 80. See Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 790. 
 81. Id. 
  82. Justice Jackson’s initial draft, which followed the same rough outline, titled Part I Capacity to Sue for 
Writ, Part II Claim of Constitutional Rights as Basis for Writ, Part III Unconstitutional Acts as Basis for Writ, 
and Part IV Prisoners’ Claims under Geneva Convention.  See Draft Eisentrager Opinion, supra n. 56, at 4, 8, 
12, 17.  To whatever extent the organization of the initial draft provides further insight into Jackson’s intent, it 
suggests that Jackson’s methodology was to eliminate each possible basis for habeas jurisdiction.  The negative 
implication of that inference, though, is that any of the individual bases for jurisdiction would have sufficed, 
had they been present. 
 83. Id. at 792 (Black, Douglas & Burton JJ., dissenting) (citations and footnote omitted); see also id. at 793 
(“To decide this unargued question under these circumstances seems an unwarranted and highly improper 
deviation from ordinary judicial procedure.”). 
 84. See e.g. id. at 794 (“Except insofar as this holding depends on the gratuitous conclusions in Part IV (and 
I cannot tell how far it does), it is based on the facts that (1) they were enemy aliens who were belligerents 
when captured, and (2) they were captured, tried, and imprisoned outside our realm, never having been in the 
United States.”). 
 85. Id. at 796. 
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holding—albeit sub silentio—that the federal courts could exercise jurisdiction over 
habeas petitions filed by U.S. citizens held overseas, and notwithstanding Ahrens.86  And 
in 1973, the Court finally healed Ahrens’s “self-inflicted . . . wound,”87 holding in 
Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Kentucky88 that a district court could exercise 
subject-matter jurisdiction over a habeas petition so long as it could exercise personal 
jurisdiction over the respondent.89 
Indeed, only once in the five decades between Eisentrager and September 11 did 
the Supreme Court discuss that decision in any meaningful detail.  In his opinion for the 
plurality in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez,90 Chief Justice Rehnquist adopted a 
particularly expansive view of Jackson’s holding, citing the decision for the idea that 
“we have rejected the claim that aliens are entitled to Fifth Amendment rights outside the 
sovereign territory of the United States,”91 in support of his conclusion that the same 
should be true for the Fourth Amendment. 
Whatever Eisentrager held as to the extraterritorial scope of habeas corpus, 
Rehnquist’s reading of the opinion with respect to the Fifth Amendment is simply 
unsupported by its text.  For starters, at most, Eisentrager rejected the claim that enemy 
aliens are entitled to Fifth Amendment rights outside the territorial United States—as 
Justice Brennan observed in his dissent in Verdugo-Urquidez.92  But as noted above, 
Jackson did not even categorically reject due process rights for enemy aliens; he 
concluded instead that the Fifth Amendment did not preclude the U.S. government from 
subjecting the Eisentrager detainees to military jurisdiction93—hardly a categorical 
preclusion of constitutional protection.94 
The merits of the Verdugo-Urquidez debate notwithstanding, the 1990 decision 
helps to illustrate, at the very least, how un-careful treatments of Eisentrager have 
historically been and how unclear the “rule” Eisentrager enunciated actually was, even 
before September 11.  It undoubtedly was clear that Eisentrager’s holding was putatively 
jurisdictional, but the specific reason(s) why the detainees in Eisentrager were not 
protected by the Suspension Clause were left open to debate. 
                                                                                                                                               
 86. See e.g. Burns, 346 U.S. 137; see also U.S. ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1955).  See generally 
Vladeck, supra n. 39, at 298–300 (discussing the significance of these decisions). 
 87. See U.S. ex rel. Sero v. Preiser, 506 F.2d 1115, 1128 (2d Cir. 1974). 
 88. 410 U.S. 484 (1973). 
 89. But see Vladeck, supra n. 1, at 1512 n. 78 (noting the Supreme Court’s back-door resurrection of 
Ahrens through its adoption of the “immediate custodian rule” in Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004)). 
 90. 494 U.S. 259 (1990) (plurality). 
 91. Id. at 269 (noting that “our rejection of extraterritorial application of the Fifth Amendment was 
emphatic”). 
 92. See id. at 290–91 (Brennan & Marshall, JJ., dissenting). 
 93. See supra n. 73 and accompanying text. 
 94. Even after Boumediene, the D.C. Circuit has continued to cite Eisentrager for the overbroad proposition 
that it categorically forecloses due process rights for non-citizens detained outside the territorial United States.  
See Kiyemba, 555 F.3d 1022, 1026, 1028 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 
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II. STEEL CO. AND THE DEMISE OF “HYPOTHETICAL JURISDICTION” 
A. Justifying Jurisdictional Formalism: Steel Co. 
At first blush, Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment95 came to the 
Supreme Court as a run-of-the-mill environmental protection lawsuit, arising out of a 
circuit split over the scope of the citizen-suit provision of the Emergency Planning and 
Community Right-to-Know Act of 1996 (EPCRA).96  Specifically, the EPCRA 
authorizes suits when a manufacturer fails to timely file toxic- and hazardous-chemical 
storage and emission reports, and the lower courts divided on whether that cause of 
action extends to cases where the offending company did subsequently file the required 
paperwork—i.e., where the violation was historical, rather than ongoing.  Although the 
Sixth Circuit (and the district court in Steel Co.) answered that question in the negative,97 
the Seventh Circuit held that citizens may seek penalties against EPCRA violators like 
Steel Co. who file after the statutory deadline and after receiving notice.98 
Before the Supreme Court, though, Steel Co. also challenged whether Citizens for 
a Better Environment (“CBE”) had Article III standing to bring such a claim.  Thus, the 
Court was not only tasked with resolving the standing question, but also the order-of-
battle as between whether the plaintiffs had standing and whether they had properly 
stated a cause of action (the basis for the circuit split).  After explaining that the 
existence of a valid cause of action did not implicate the jurisdiction of the federal courts 
so long as the cause of action alleged was arguable,99 Justice Scalia then turned to why 
the federal courts could not assume the existence of subject-matter jurisdiction—what 
the lower courts had called “hypothetical jurisdiction”—in order to reach the merits: 
 We decline to endorse such an approach because it carries the courts beyond the 
bounds of authorized judicial action and thus offends fundamental principles of separation 
of powers.  This conclusion should come as no surprise, since it is reflected in a long and 
venerable line of our cases.  “Without jurisdiction the court cannot proceed at all in any 
cause.  Jurisdiction is power to declare the law, and when it ceases to exist, the only 
function remaining to the court is that of announcing the fact and dismissing the cause.” 
On every writ of error or appeal, the first and fundamental question is that of 
jurisdiction, first, of this court, and then of the court from which the record comes.  
This question the court is bound to ask and answer for itself, even when not otherwise 
suggested, and without respect to the relation of the parties to it. 
The requirement that jurisdiction be established as a threshold matter “spring[s] from the 
nature and limits of the judicial power of the United States” and is “inflexible and without 
exception.”100 
Thus, Justice Scalia reasoned, the Court could not reach whether the citizen-suit 
                                                                                                                                               
 95. 523 U.S. 83 [hereinafter Steel Co.]. 
 96. 42 U.S.C. § 11001–11050 (2006) (providing the citizen-suit provision at § 11046(a)(1)). 
 97. See A. Sts. Leg. Found., Inc. v. United Musical Instruments, U.S.A., Inc., 61 F.3d 473 (6th Cir. 1995); 
Citizens for a Better Envt. v. Steel Co., 1995 WL 758122 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 21, 1995) [hereinafter Steel Co. I]. 
 98. See Citizens for a Better Envt. v. Steel Co., 90 F.3d 1237 (7th Cir. 1996) [hereinafter Steel Co. II]. 
 99. See Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 89–93. 
 100. Id. at 94–95 (alteration in original) (citations omitted). 
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provision of the ECPRA conferred a cause of action along the lines found by the Seventh 
Circuit without first resolving whether CBE in fact had Article III standing.  Moreover, 
Scalia rejected the extent to which earlier decisions seemed to allow resolution of the 
cause-of-action question as an antecedent matter (assuming without deciding 
jurisdiction), noting that “[w]e have often said that drive-by jurisdictional rulings of this 
sort . . . have no precedential effect.”101  Even though a host of earlier decisions had 
seemed to recognize the suitability of assuming jurisdiction in certain circumstances, 
Justice Scalia concluded that 
none of them even approaches approval of a doctrine of “hypothetical jurisdiction” that 
enables a court to resolve contested questions of law when its jurisdiction is in doubt.  
Hypothetical jurisdiction produces nothing more than a hypothetical judgment—which 
comes to the same thing as an advisory opinion, disapproved by this Court from the 
beginning.102 
On the merits, the Court concluded that CBE could not satisfy the third prong of 
Article III standing—redressability.  As Justice Scalia explained, “None of the specific 
items of relief sought, and none that we can envision as ‘appropriate’ under the general 
request, would serve to reimburse respondent for losses caused by the late reporting, or 
to eliminate any effects of that late reporting upon respondent.”103 
Concurring, Justice O’Connor (who, with Justice Kennedy, formed the votes 
necessary for the majority) suggested that there might be circumstances other than those 
identified in previous cases where it was appropriate to reserve the difficult jurisdictional 
question in order to reach the merits.104  Justice Breyer would have gone even further, 
noting in a partial concurrence his concern that such a formalistic rule would unduly 
burden lower federal court judges.105  But whatever the misgivings about Steel Co.’s 
scope, its meaning was unambiguous: Federal courts were to decide subject-matter 
jurisdiction questions first in all but the rarest of cases, and irrespective of the merits. 
B. Steel Co.’s Impact: Jurisdiction First, Merits Last 
To be sure, subsequent decisions have somewhat diluted the force of Steel Co.’s 
holding.  In Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co.,106 for example, a unanimous Court held 
that Steel Co. does not require the federal courts to reach difficult questions of subject-
matter jurisdiction before easier questions of personal jurisdiction that produce the same 
result—dismissal.107  Similarly, a unanimous Court held in 2007 that the lower federal 
courts could dismiss a lawsuit on forum non conveniens grounds without resolving 
difficult questions as to their subject-matter jurisdiction.108  As Justice Ginsburg wrote 
                                                                                                                                               
 101. Id. at 91 (citing Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 352 n. 2 (1996); Fed. Election Commn. v. NRA Political 
Victory Fund, 513 U.S. 88, 97 (1994); U.S. v. L.A. Tucker Truck Lines, Inc., 344 U.S. 33, 38 (1952)). 
 102. Id. at 101 (citing Muskrat v. U.S., 219 U.S. 346, 362 (1911); Hayburn’s Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 408 
(1792)). 
 103. Id. at 105–06 (footnote omitted). 
 104. See Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 110–11 (O’Connor & Kennedy, JJ., concurring). 
 105. See id. at 111–12 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
 106. 526 U.S. 574. 
 107. See id. at 583–88. 
 108. See Sinochem, 549 U.S. at 430–31. 
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for the Court in Sinochem International Co. v. Malaysia International Shipping Corp., 
 Both Steel Co. and Ruhrgas recognized that a federal court has leeway “to choose 
among threshold grounds for denying audience to a case on the merits.”  Dismissal short of 
reaching the merits means that the court will not “proceed at all” to an adjudication of the 
cause.  Thus, a district court declining to adjudicate state-law claims on discretionary 
grounds need not first determine whether those claims fall within its pendent jurisdiction.  
Nor must a federal court decide whether the parties present an Article III case or 
controversy before abstaining under Younger v. Harris.  A dismissal under Totten v. United 
States,[109] . . ., we recently observed, also “represents the sort of ‘threshold question’ 
[that] . . . may be resolved before addressing jurisdiction.”  The principle underlying these 
decisions was well stated by the Seventh Circuit: “[J]urisdiction is vital only if the court 
proposes to issue a judgment on the merits.”110 
But these subsequent decisions only drive home the point that Steel Co. compels 
resolution of subject-matter jurisdiction before reaching any questions as to the merits 
(as distinct from other non-jurisdictional non-merits questions).  Thus, Steel Co. suggests 
that the merits are completely irrelevant to any bar on subject-matter jurisdiction that is 
itself unrelated to the merits.  The Justices may have quarreled over Steel Co.’s 
application to other non-merits-based grounds for dismissal, but the unanimity of the 
decisions in Ruhrgas and Sinochem suggests that this central principle of Steel Co. 
was—and remains—undisputed. 
C. The Vitality of Pre-Steel Co. Jurisdictional Rules 
Steel Co.’s effect on judicial decision-making has been well-documented 
elsewhere.111  Of relevance here, it unquestionably has prompted heightened sensitivity 
in the lower courts to the distinction between “jurisdictional” and non-jurisdictional 
“claim processing” rules—so much so, in fact, that the Supreme Court has had to reverse 
a number of lower-court decisions construing as “jurisdictional” rules that are, in the 
Court’s view, anything but.112 
But of more interest here is the effect of Steel Co. on pre-Steel Co. decisions.  
Justice Scalia himself expressed skepticism in Steel Co. as to the precedential value of 
“drive-by jurisdictional rulings,” by which he meant decisions where courts described 
particular issues as “jurisdictional,” even though they were not.113  After Steel Co., both 
the Supreme Court and the lower federal courts have routinely brushed aside the 
                                                                                                                                               
 109. 92 U.S. 105 (1876) (prohibiting suits against the U.S. based upon covert espionage agreements); see 
also Tenet v. Doe, 544 U.S. 1, 6 n. 4 (2005) (noting that applicability of the Totten bar can be resolved before 
subject-matter jurisdiction). 
 110. Sinochem, 549 U.S. at 431 (alterations in original) (citations omitted). 
 111. See e.g. sources cited supra n. 25. 
 112. See e.g. Arbaugh, 546 U.S. 500 (holding that Title VII’s employee-numerosity requirement is not 
“jurisdictional”); Eberhart, 546 U.S. at 19 (per curiam) (holding that the seven-day time limit for pursuing a 
new trial under Fed. R. Crim. P. 33(a) is not “jurisdictional”); Scarborough, 541 U.S. at 418–21 (holding that 
the Equal Access to Justice Act’s 30-day deadline for attorney fee applications under 28 U.S.C. § 
2412(d)(1)(B) is not “jurisdictional”); Kontrick, 540 U.S. at 456–60 (holding that the time limit for a creditor to 
file objections to a bankruptcy discharge under Fed. R. Bankr. P. 4004 is not “jurisdictional”).  For one 
counterexample to this trend, see Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205 (2007) (holding that the timely filing of 
notice in a civil appeal is jurisdictional).  See generally Alex Lees, Student Author, The Jurisdictional Label: 
Use and Misuse, 58 Stan. L. Rev. 1457 (2006) (discussing the values at stake in these cases). 
 113. See Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 91. 
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precedential value of such decisions, noting that they “should be accorded ‘no 
precedential effect’ on the question whether the federal court had authority to adjudicate 
the claim in suit.”114 
Moreover, although Justice Scalia did not expand his analysis beyond decisions 
describing as “jurisdictional” holdings that in fact were not, it should follow that similar 
concerns would attach to decisions that (1) failed to address apparent jurisdictional 
defects (and whether they thereby served as precedent in favor of jurisdiction); or (2) left 
unclear the extent to which the merits bore on the absence of “jurisdiction.”  Under Steel 
Co.’s approach to the judicial order-of-battle, any resolution of the merits of the 
plaintiffs’ claims in a decision dismissing for lack of jurisdiction would necessarily 
imply that the merits (or lack thereof) were relevant to the absence of jurisdiction.  Thus, 
where the precise nature of a pre-Steel Co. jurisdictional rule was unclear, Steel Co.’s 
approach suggested that courts should attempt to parameterize that rule by reference to 
the role that the facts and the merits did or did not play in the original decision.  It was 
not that such decisions were entitled to “no precedential effect,” but rather that such 
decisions should, for lack of a better term, be narrowly construed, on the assumption that 
the rendering court would not have paid so much attention to circumstances that did not 
meaningfully bear on the result. 
III. HIROTA AND EISENTRAGER AS “NON-PRECEDENT” 
A. Rasul and Eisentrager’s “Statutory Predicate” 
For obvious reasons, the vitality of Eisentrager as precedent became a central issue 
in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks, especially with the onset of U.S. military 
operations in Afghanistan in the fall of 2001 and the subsequent detention of captured 
“enemy combatants” at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba.  Indeed, the Justice Department’s 
Office of Legal Counsel heavily relied on the 1950 decision in a December 2001 opinion 
suggesting that it was unlikely that federal courts would have the power to review 
detentions at Guantánamo.115 
Thus, when the first Guantánamo detainees sought to challenge their detention 
through federal habeas petitions filed in the D.C. district court in the summer of 2002, 
the lower courts dismissed their claims entirely on the authority of Eisentrager.116  
                                                                                                                                               
 114. Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 511 (citing Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 91); see also e.g. Winnett v. Caterpillar Inc., 
553 F.3d 1000 (6th Cir. 2009); Beazer E., Inc. v. Mead Corp., 525 F.3d 255 (3d Cir. 2008); DDB Techs., L.L.C. 
v. MLB Adv. Media, L.P., 517 F.3d 1284 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Price, 501 F.3d 271 (3d Cir. 
2007); Moreno-Bravo v. Gonzales, 463 F.3d 253 (2d Cir. 2006); Bell v. Bonneville Power Admin., 340 F.3d 
945, 951–52 (9th Cir. 2003).  For one counterexample—where the lower court rejected the argument that Steel 
Co. undermined the precedential value of a prior decision—see Hanson v. Wyatt, 552 F.3d 1148, 1162–64 
(10th Cir. 2008). 
 115. See Memo. from Patrick F. Philbin, Dep. Asst. Atty. Gen., & John C. Yoo, Dep. Asst. Atty. Gen., Off. 
Leg. Counsel, to William J. Haynes II, Gen. Counsel, Dept. Def., 1–4 (Dec. 28, 2001).  The memorandum did 
stress that, “[b]ecause the issue has not yet been definitively been resolved by the courts, however, we caution 
there is some possibility that a district court would entertain such an application.”  Id. at 9. 
 116. See Rasul v. Bush, 215 F. Supp. 2d 55, 65 (D.D.C. 2002) (“[T]he Court concludes that the Supreme 
Court’s ruling in Johnson v. Eisentrager, and its progeny, are controlling and bars the Court’s consideration of 
the merits of these two cases.” (citation omitted)), aff’d sub nom. Al Odah v. U.S., 321 F.3d 1134 (D.C. Cir. 
2003), rev’d sub nom. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466. 
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Indeed, even though the D.C. Circuit conceded that “it follows that none of the 
Guantanamo detainees are within the category of ‘enemy aliens,’ at least as Eisentrager 
used the term,”117 it nonetheless concluded that 
the Guantanamo detainees have much in common with the German prisoners in 
Eisentrager.  They too are aliens, they too were captured during military operations, they 
were in a foreign country when captured, they are now abroad, they are in the custody of 
the American military, and they have never had any presence in the United States. . . .  
[U]nder Eisentrager these factors preclude the detainees from seeking habeas relief in the 
courts of the United States.118 
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Eisentrager was inapposite.  As Justice 
Stevens explained, “the Court in Eisentrager made quite clear that all six of the facts 
critical to its disposition were relevant only to the question of the prisoners’ 
constitutional entitlement to habeas corpus.  The Court had far less to say on the question 
of the petitioners’ statutory entitlement to habeas review.”119  The Eisentrager Court, 
Stevens argued, proceeded on the assumption that, per Ahrens, statutory habeas was 
unavailable.  In contrast, because Ahrens had since been overruled, the question before 
the Court in Rasul was only whether the statute conferred jurisdiction over the detainees’ 
claims, a question on which Eisentrager had nothing to say.120  As a question of first 
impression, then, the Rasul majority concluded that the habeas statute should be read as 
conferring jurisdiction over the detainees’ petitions, given that the D.C. district court 
unquestionably had jurisdiction over the detainees’ custodians.121 
Concurring in the judgment, Justice Kennedy argued that “the correct course is to 
follow the framework of Eisentrager,”122 and then explained why he believed 
Eisentrager did not control the question of habeas jurisdiction over Guantánamo.  
Specifically, Kennedy explained that “[t]he facts here are distinguishable from those in 
Eisentrager in two critical ways, leading to the conclusion that a federal court may 
entertain the petitions.  First, Guantanamo Bay is in every practical respect a United 
States territory, and it is one far removed from any hostilities.”123  Second, “the 
detainees at Guantanamo Bay are being held indefinitely, and without benefit of any 
legal proceeding to determine their status.”124  In contrast, the Eisentrager petitioners 
were challenging their trial by military tribunal—in which they had received precisely 
that kind of adversarial status determination.125 
Justice Scalia—on behalf of Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas—
dissented, arguing that “Eisentrager’s directly-on-point statutory holding makes it 
exceedingly difficult for the Court to reach the result it desires today.”126  Instead, Scalia 
                                                                                                                                               
  117. Al Odah v. U.S., 321 F.3d at 1140. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Rasul, 542 U.S. at 476 (emphasis in original) (citation omitted). 
 120. Id. at 479 (“Because Braden overruled the statutory predicate to Eisentrager’s holding, Eisentrager 
plainly does not preclude the exercise of § 2241 jurisdiction over petitioners’ claims.” (footnote omitted)). 
 121. See id. at 483–84. 
 122. Id. at 485 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 123. Id. at 487. 
 124. Rasul, 542 U.S. at 487–88. 
 125. See id. at 488. 
 126. Id. at 493 (Scalia, J., Rehnquist, C.J. & Thomas, J., dissenting). 
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argued that Braden had left undisturbed the unavailability of statutory jurisdiction, and 
that the majority had no recourse other than to overrule Eisentrager sub silentio: 
The fact that extraterritorially located detainees lack the district of detention that the statute 
requires has been converted from a factor that precludes their ability to bring a petition at 
all into a factor that frees them to petition wherever they wish—and, as a result, to forum-
shop.  For this Court to create such a monstrous scheme in time of war, and in frustration 
of our military commanders’ reliance upon clearly stated prior law, is judicial adventurism 
of the worst sort.  I dissent.127 
Whatever the merits of the different readings of case law in the Rasul opinions, it 
is significant that no part of the dispute centered on Eisentrager’s constitutional analysis.  
Indeed, with the exception of a tantalizing yet obtuse footnote in Justice Stevens’s 
majority opinion,128 none of the Justices squarely engaged the constitutional questions 
lurking in the background.  Rasul was, at least in the foreground, a case about statutory 
interpretation. 
B. Boumediene’s and Eisentrager’s Constitutional Methodology 
Congress eventually responded to Rasul (after the Supreme Court granted 
certiorari in Hamdan) in the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 (DTA),129 in which it 
codified the process created by the Department of Defense for detainee review,130 
providing for appeals of Combatant Status Review Tribunals (CSRTs) and military 
commission convictions to the D.C. Circuit,131 and otherwise purporting to divest the 
federal courts of jurisdiction over the Guantánamo detainees’ claims.132  In Hamdan v. 
Rumsfeld,133 the Supreme Court held that the DTA was insufficiently clear as to whether 
it applied to pending cases.134  In response, Congress enacted the Military Commissions 
Act of 2006 (MCA),135 which was far more explicit as to the stripping of jurisdiction: 
No court, justice, or judge shall have jurisdiction to hear or consider an application for a 
writ of habeas corpus filed by or on behalf of an alien detained by the United States who 
has been determined by the United States to have been properly detained as an enemy 
combatant or is awaiting such determination.136 
                                                                                                                                               
 127. Id. at 506. 
 128. See id. at 483 n. 15 (majority) (“Petitioners’ allegations—that, although they have engaged neither in 
combat nor in acts of terrorism against the United States, they have been held in executive detention for more 
than two years in territory subject to the long-term, exclusive jurisdiction and control of the United States, 
without access to counsel and without being charged with any wrongdoing—unquestionably describe ‘custody 
in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.’”). 
 129. Pub. L. No. 109-148, div. A, tit. X, 119 Stat. 2680, 2739–46 (2005) (codified in scattered sections of 10, 
28, and 42 U.S.C.). 
 130. In the aftermath of Rasul and Hamdi, the Defense Department created the Combatant Status Review 
Tribunals (CSRTs) to provide the amount of process it believed that those decisions required.  See Hamdan, 
548 U.S. at 570 n. 1 (describing the creation of the CSRT process). 
 131. DTA § 1005(e)(2)–(3), 119 Stat. at 2742. 
 132. Id. at § 1005(e)(1), 119 Stat. at 2742. 
 133. 548 U.S. 557. 
 134. See id. at 572–84. 
 135. Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (codified in scattered sections of 10, 18, and 28 U.S.C.). 
 136. Id. at § 7(a), 120 Stat. at 2635–2636 § 7(e) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e) (2006)).  Another (and 
heretofore overlooked) provision of the MCA, codified at 10 U.S.C. § 950j(b) (2006), provides comparable 
constraints on federal jurisdiction for individuals seeking collaterally to challenge their trial by military 
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In short, the MCA forced the constitutional question that the Supreme Court had 
evaded in Rasul, i.e., whether non-citizens detained at Guantánamo have a constitutional 
right to habeas corpus.  For the D.C. Circuit, at least, that question was easily resolved on 
the authority of Eisentrager.  As Judge Randolph explained, “Johnson v. Eisentrager 
ends any doubt about the scope of common law habeas,”137 and “[a]ny distinction 
between the naval base at Guantanamo Bay and the prison in Landsberg, Germany, 
where the petitioners in Eisentrager were held, is immaterial to the application of the 
Suspension Clause.”138  The Court of Appeals thus concluded that the Suspension 
Clause did not apply to the Gantánamo detainees, and that the MCA was therefore not 
unconstitutional to the extent it deprived the detainees of access to habeas corpus.139 
The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Kennedy, reversed.140  Kennedy’s 
discussion of Eisentrager came as part of his larger analysis of the extraterritorial 
application of the Constitution, a survey that included a detailed summary of the Insular 
Cases,141 Reid v. Covert,142 and In re Ross.143  As Justice Kennedy summarized, 
“noting the inherent practical difficulties of enforcing all constitutional provisions 
‘always and everywhere, . . . ’ the Court [in these cases] devised . . . a doctrine that 
allowed it to use its power sparingly and where it would be most needed.”144  In other 
words, the Court’s precedents contemplated a doctrine based upon “[p]ractical 
considerations,” rather than formal territory- or citizenship-driven rules.145 
“True,” Kennedy continued,  
the Court in Eisentrager denied access to the writ, and it noted the prisoners “at no relevant 
time were within any territory over which the United States is sovereign, and [that] the 
scenes of their offense, their capture, their trial and their punishment were all beyond the 
territorial jurisdiction of any court of the United States.”146 
But Kennedy identified three reasons why Eisentrager should not be read as 
categorically resting the scope of the Suspension Clause on formal conceptions of 
sovereignty.  First, Jackson’s opinion nonetheless devoted several pages to “practical 
considerations, [which] were integral to Part II of its opinion and came before the 
decision announced its holding.”147  Second, and related, Kennedy emphasized that the 
Eisentrager Court did not focus its analysis on questions of territorial sovereignty.  In his 
                                                                                                                                               
commission.  See Stephen I. Vladeck, Military Jurisdiction, the Right Not to Be Tried, and the Suspension 
Clause after Boumediene, 16 Hum. Rts. Brief 6 (2008) (describing § 950j(b) and arguing why it is 
unconstitutional in light of Boumediene). 
 137. Boumediene, 476 F.3d at 990 (citation omitted). 
 138. Id. at 992. 
 139. See id. 
 140. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. 2229. 
 141. The Insular Cases were actually a series of decisions issued over a roughly two-decade-long span 
concerning the applicability of specific constitutional provisions in the U.S. territories, including Puerto Rico, 
Guam, the Philippines, and Hawaii.  See id. at 2254 (citing cases).  See generally Bartholomew H. Sparrow, 
The Insular Cases and the Emergence of American Empire (U. Press Kan. 2006). 
 142. 354 U.S. 1 (1957) (plurality). 
 143. 140 U.S. 453 (1891). 
 144. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2255. 
 145. See id. at 2253–57 (citation omitted). 
 146. Id. at 2257 (citation omitted) (alteration in original). 
 147. Id. 
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words, 
That the Court devoted a significant portion of Part II to a discussion of practical barriers to 
the running of the writ suggests that the Court was not concerned exclusively with the 
formal legal status of Landsberg Prison but also with the objective degree of control the 
United States asserted over it.  Even if we assume the Eisentrager Court considered the 
United States’ lack of formal legal sovereignty over Landsberg Prison as the decisive 
factor in that case, its holding is not inconsistent with a functional approach to questions of 
extraterritoriality.148 
Finally, Kennedy noted that if Eisentrager really had adopted a formalistic 
approach to the extraterritorial scope of the Constitution, it would have been “a complete 
repudiation” of the Court’s approach in the Insular Cases, as largely adopted after 
Eisentrager in Reid v. Covert, but “[o]ur cases need not be read to conflict in this 
manner.  A constricted reading of Eisentrager overlooks what we see as a common 
thread uniting the Insular Cases, Eisentrager, and Reid: the idea that questions of 
extraterritoriality turn on objective factors and practical concerns, not formalism.”149 
Justice Kennedy’s opinion went on to suggest that the government’s formalistic 
approach would raise troubling separation-of-powers concerns as well,150 but his 
analysis of Eisentrager is what matters for present purposes.  Reiterating his concurrence 
in the judgment in Rasul, Kennedy observed that 
[A]t least three factors are relevant in determining the reach of the Suspension Clause: (1) 
the citizenship and status of the detainee and the adequacy of the process through which 
that status determination was made; (2) the nature of the sites where apprehension and then 
detention took place; and (3) the practical obstacles inherent in resolving the prisoner’s 
entitlement to the writ.151 
Each of these factors, in Kennedy’s view, tilted in favor of extending the 
Suspension Clause to apply to non-citizens detained at Guantánamo Bay.152  Although 
Kennedy conceded that “before today the Court has never held that noncitizens detained 
by our Government in territory over which another country maintains de jure sovereignty 
have any rights under our Constitution,”153 he suggested that “the cases before us lack 
any precise historical parallel. . . .  Under these circumstances the lack of a precedent on 
point is no barrier to our holding.”154  Instead, the Court concluded that the Suspension 
Clause “has full effect at Guantanamo Bay,”155 and proceeded to decide whether the 
DTA and MCA between them satisfied the Suspension Clause (by providing an adequate 
substitute for habeas).156  Reasoning that the statutes failed to so provide, the Court 
struck down section 7 as applied to the Guantánamo detainees.157 
                                                                                                                                               
 148. Id. at 2258. 
 149. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2258. 
 150. See id. at 2258–59.  I devote far more attention to the origins and significance of Kennedy’s separation-
of-powers analysis in Vladeck, supra note 15. 
 151. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2259. 
 152. See id. at 2259–62. 
 153. Id. at 2262. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. 
 156. See Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2263–74. 
 157. See id. at 2275–77. 
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In addition to a dissent from Chief Justice Roberts focusing on Kennedy’s analysis 
of whether the DTA and MCA provided an adequate substitute for habeas corpus, Justice 
Scalia’s vigorous dissent focused on the majority’s analysis of Eisentrager and the 
Suspension Clause’s extraterritorial application.  In his words, “[t]he Court purports to 
derive from our precedents a ‘functional’ test for the extraterritorial reach of the writ, 
which shows that the Military Commissions Act unconstitutionally restricts the scope of 
habeas.  That is remarkable because the most pertinent of those precedents, Johnson v. 
Eisentrager, conclusively establishes the opposite.”158  Thus, after quoting various 
passages from Jackson’s Eisentrager opinion, Scalia concluded that “Eisentrager thus 
held—held beyond any doubt—that the Constitution does not ensure habeas for aliens 
held by the United States in areas over which our Government is not sovereign.”159 
Justice Scalia went on to belittle the majority’s suggestion that Eisentrager turned 
on “practical considerations,” noting that Eisentrager cited such concerns “not for the 
purpose of determining under what circumstances American courts could issue writs of 
habeas corpus for aliens abroad . . . [but] to support its holding that the Constitution does 
not empower courts to issue writs of habeas corpus to aliens abroad in any 
circumstances.”160  Thus: 
 There is simply no support for the Court’s assertion that constitutional rights extend to 
aliens held outside U.S. sovereign territory, and Eisentrager could not be clearer that the 
privilege of habeas corpus does not extend to aliens abroad.  By blatantly distorting 
Eisentrager, the Court avoids the difficulty of explaining why it should be overruled.  The 
rule that aliens abroad are not constitutionally entitled to habeas corpus has not proved 
unworkable in practice; if anything, it is the Court’s “functional” test that does not (and 
never will) provide clear guidance for the future.  Eisentrager forms a coherent whole with 
the accepted proposition that aliens abroad have no substantive rights under our 
Constitution. . . .  It is a sad day for the rule of law when such an important constitutional 
precedent is discarded without an apologia, much less an apology.161 
Scalia then went on to suggest why, even on a blank slate, the Court should not 
extend the Suspension Clause to the non-citizens detained at Guantánamo, but the 
gravamen of his dissent was the charge that the Court was unfaithful to Eisentrager.  
Scholarly critiques of Boumediene thus far have similarly focused on the majority’s 
fidelity to precedent—or, more precisely, its lack thereof.162 
What the above analysis should make clear is that Jackson’s opinion in Eisentrager 
has, as then-Solicitor General Paul Clement put it at oral argument in the Supreme Court 
in Hamdan, “an awful lot of alternative holdings.”163  At most, the majority opinion 
seemed to conclude that enemy aliens detained abroad have no constitutional right of 
                                                                                                                                               
 158. Id. at 2298 (Scalia, J., Roberts C.J., Thomas & Alito, JJ., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
 159. Id. at 2298–99. 
 160. Id. at 2299 (emphasis in original). 
 161. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2302 (citations omitted). 
 162. See e.g. Eric A. Posner, Boumediene and the Uncertain March of Judicial Cosmopolitanism, 2008 Cato 
S. Ct. Rev. 23, 25–32 (arguing that Boumediene is largely unfaithful to Eisentrager); Robert J. Pushaw, 
Creating Legal Rights for Suspected Terrorists: Is the Court Being Courageous or Politically Pragmatic? 84 
Notre Dame L. Rev. ___ (forthcoming 2009) (ms. at 79, copy on file with author). 
 163. Oral Argument Transcr. at 72, Hamdan, 548 U.S. 557 (statement of Sol. Gen. Paul Clement) (available 
at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/05-184.pdf). 
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access to habeas corpus, and even that much may have turned on the fact-specific 
conclusions that Jackson reached in Parts III and IV, including (1) that the detainees 
there had been convicted of war crimes by a military tribunal; (2) that the Constitution 
did not bar their trial by military tribunal; and (3) that the military tribunal properly 
exercised jurisdiction over the detainees.  As such, it is simply unclear, looking 
backwards at Eisentrager, how central a role each of these considerations played in the 
Court’s analysis of whether habeas corpus should extend to the detainees.  It would 
certainly not be fair to call Eisentrager a “drive-by jurisdictional ruling,” as Justice 
Scalia used the term in Steel Co., but Jackson’s analysis does seem to allow for 
disagreement among reasonable readers over the significance of the merits.  In such 
circumstances, Steel Co.’s logic seems to suggest that one should take Eisentrager’s 
discussion of the merits into account in ascertaining the specific contours of the 
jurisdictional rule it enunciated. 
After all, if Eisentrager meant to preclude the constitutional protection of habeas 
corpus to all non-citizens outside the territorial United States, none of its discussion of 
the detainees’ status as “enemy” aliens should have mattered.  If, instead, Eisentrager 
meant to deny a constitutional right to habeas corpus to all enemy aliens outside the 
territorial United States, the conclusions that the Fifth Amendment did not bar their trial 
by military tribunal, and that the tribunal that convicted the detainees properly exercised 
jurisdiction, equally should not have mattered.  Viewed in light of Steel Co., though, 
these discussions would not just have been irrelevant; they would have been almost 
lawless to the extent that Eisentrager’s jurisdictional rule rendered them irrelevant.  As 
seen through Steel Co.’s lens, then, the presumption should be that the facts did matter, 
and that the Eisentrager majority did not mean to reach cases where non-citizens held 
outside the territorial United States either had not been convicted by a military tribunal, 
or had been convicted by a tribunal that acted without jurisdiction. 
To be sure, reasonable people will disagree—strongly, I am sure—over the extent 
to which the Constitution, including the Suspension Clause, should apply to non-citizens 
detained outside the territorial United States.  My point here is only that whether or not 
Eisentrager or Boumediene were rightly decided, the Court in the latter case was not 
bound in any meaningful way to follow the “rule” articulated in the former. 
C. Omar, Munaf, and Hirota’s “Foregoing Circumstances” 
Compared to the competing views of the significance of Eisentrager to the 
Guantánamo litigation, the dispute over the relevance of Hirota in the cases of two U.S. 
citizens detained in Iraq has proven far less controversial.164 
Hirota first surfaced in a 2004 D.C. district court decision arising out of allegations 
by a U.S. citizen that he was subjected to the government’s “extraordinary rendition” 
program.165  Although the citizen—Omar Abu Ali—was in the formal custody of Saudi 
Arabia at the time he filed his petition, he alleged that he was in the “constructive 
                                                                                                                                               
 164. Indeed, scholarly discussions of Munaf have generally been few and far between, except as footnotes to 
discussions of Boumediene.  For one of the few exceptions, see The Supreme Court, 2007 Term—Leading 
Cases, 122 Harv. L. Rev. 415 (2008). 
 165. Abu Ali v. Ashcroft, 350 F. Supp. 2d 28, 55–57 (D.D.C. 2004). 
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custody” of the U.S. government, which was therefore sufficient to satisfy the 
jurisdictional prerequisites of the federal habeas statute.166  In response, the government 
moved to dismiss, arguing that Hirota precluded the exercise of habeas jurisdiction over 
any individual in foreign custody.  The district court denied the motion to dismiss, 
though, concluding that: 
 The United States can hardly rely on a decision involving non-resident aliens 
challenging the sentence of a foreign military tribunal as controlling precedent for a rule 
that citizens lack any rights in habeas to challenge their detention (without charges, much 
less convictions) by a foreign government allegedly at the behest of the United States.167 
Although the district court ordered discovery with respect to the U.S. 
government’s role in Abu Ali’s detention in Saudi Arabia, the government subsequently 
mooted the petition—and the Hirota question—by transferring Abu Ali stateside and 
indicting him on various criminal charges.168 
Instead, the applicability of Hirota came to the forefront in a pair of cases arising 
out of the detention of two U.S. citizens by the Multinational Force–Iraq (“MNF–I”), 
Shawqi Ahmed Omar and Mohammed Munaf.  Omar sought to challenge his transfer to 
the custody of the Central Criminal Court of Iraq (“CCC–I”), where he claimed he faced 
trial.  Munaf, in contrast, had already been convicted and sentenced to death by the 
CCC–I, and sought to collaterally attack his conviction and sentence through habeas 
corpus.169 
In Omar’s case, the district court concluded that Hirota did not preclude 
jurisdiction, relying on the fact that Omar was a U.S. citizen, that he claimed that he was 
in U.S. (rather than international) custody, and that: 
the Hirota case was decided prior to significant evolution of the Supreme Court’s habeas 
jurisprudence.  In the time between the Hirota decision and the Supreme Court’s most 
recent habeas decisions, the Supreme Court has expanded and clarified the application of 
the “Great Writ” to better fulfill its ultimate purpose of allowing an individual to present “a 
simple challenge to physical custody imposed by the Executive.”170 
The D.C. Circuit unanimously affirmed the district court’s jurisdictional analysis, 
although it divided on the merits—i.e., on Omar’s entitlement to a preliminary 
injunction.171  But the panel was clear that Hirota did not control.  As Judge Tatel wrote 
for the court, “Hirota nowhere explains which ‘circumstances’ were controlling.  Nor 
does anything in the opinion hold that federal courts lack habeas jurisdiction whenever, 
as the government insists, American officials detaining a petitioner are functioning as 
part of a multinational force.”172  Thus, “Hirota would ‘control’ this case only if the 
                                                                                                                                               
 166. For a more detailed discussion of the “constructive custody” requirement, see Karen E. Shafrir, Student 
Author, Habeas Corpus, Constructive Custody, and the Future of Federal Jurisdiction after Munaf, 16 U. 
Miami Intl. & Comp. L. Rev. 91 (2008). 
 167. Abu Ali, 350 F. Supp. 2d at 55 (emphasis in original). 
 168. See Abu Ali v. Gonzales, 387 F. Supp. 2d 16 (D.D.C. 2005); see also U.S. v. Abu Ali, 528 F.3d 210 (4th 
Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 1312 (2009). 
 169. See Vladeck, supra n. 1, at 1535–39 (summarizing the background). 
 170. See Omar v. Harvey, 416 F. Supp. 2d 19, 25 (D.D.C. 2006) (citation omitted). 
 171. See Omar, 479 F.3d 1. 
 172. Id. at 7. 
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‘circumstances’ significant to the Court’s decision are present here.  Two circumstances 
are clearly the same: detention overseas and the existence of a multinational force.  But 
two other circumstances—foreign citizenship and criminal conviction—are absent.”173 
Munaf’s case, in contrast, raised a more challenging question, since he had been 
convicted by the CCC–I.  Based on that fact, the district court found that Hirota was 
indistinguishable, concluding that: 
 Petitioner is . . . under the actual, physical custody of MNF–I, a multinational entity 
separate and distinct from the United States or its army.  He is in the constructive custody 
of the Republic of Iraq, which is seized of jurisdiction in the criminal case against him, and 
which controls his ultimate disposition.  Petitioner thus has two custodians, one actual and 
the other constructive: MNF–I and the government of Iraq.  Petitioner has not shown that 
either custodian is the equivalent of the United States for the purposes of habeas corpus 
jurisdiction.174 
Tellingly, though, Judge Lamberth did not believe that Munaf’s case was thus 
distinguishable from Omar’s; rather, he believed that Omar was wrongly decided.175 
On appeal, a different panel of the D.C. Circuit agreed with Judge Lamberth that 
Hirota was indistinguishable, although it believed such a holding was faithful to Omar.  
As Judge Sentelle wrote, “Our result is required by the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Hirota v. MacArthur, as that decision has been applied by this court in Flick v. Johnson 
and interpreted by Omar v. Harvey.”176  Specifically, 
 Unlike Omar, the instant case is controlled by Hirota and Flick.  The MNF–I is a 
multinational force, authorized by the United Nations Security Council, that operates in 
Iraq in coordination with the Iraqi government.  The CCCI is an Iraqi criminal court of 
nationwide jurisdiction and is administered by the government of Iraq; it is not a tribunal of 
the United States.  Accordingly, the district court has no power or authority to hear this 
case.177 
Thus, although the judges in the majority were at pains to point out that they did 
“not mean to suggest that we find the logic of Hirota especially clear or compelling,”178 
they nonetheless felt bound to follow what they believed was valid precedent.179 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in both cases and consolidated them for 
                                                                                                                                               
 173. Id.  In her partial dissent, Judge Brown took issue with the suggestion that Hirota could be 
distinguished based largely on citizenship—but otherwise agreed that it was not controlling.  See id. at 15 n. 1 
(Brown, J., dissenting in part). 
 174. Mohammed v. Harvey, 456 F. Supp. 2d 115, 122, 124 (D.D.C. 2006) (“Hirota and Yamashita, taken 
together, recognized that General MacArthur acted in two capacities, as both an American and Allied 
commander, and evaluated the derivation of authority by which he and his subordinates held prisoners in 
custody.  Therefore, prisoners who were in custody of the United States alone, under the sole authority of the 
United States, could invoke habeas jurisdiction.  But prisoners who were held pursuant to the authority of the 
Allies, and who were in the physical custody of American soldiers acting as members of the Allied Powers, 
were in the custody of the Allies, not the United States, and therefore could not invoke the jurisdiction of the 
U.S. courts.” (footnote omitted)). 
 175. Id. at 128 n. 12. 
 176. Munaf, 482 F.3d at 583. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. at 584. 
 179. See id. at 585–86 (Randolph, J., concurring in the judgment).  Judge Randolph—author of the majority 
opinions in Rasul, Hamdan, and Boumediene—concurred in the judgment.  He believed that the courts did have 
jurisdiction notwithstanding Hirota, but that Munaf was bound to lose on the merits in any event.  Id. 
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argument.180  And although the Iraqi courts vacated Munaf’s conviction while the appeal 
was pending,181 the Court found the factual gymnastics performed by the district courts 
and the D.C. Circuit wholly unnecessary.  After noting how the plain text of 28 U.S.C. § 
2241 seemed to contemplate jurisdiction, Chief Justice Roberts quickly disposed of the 
government’s contention that Hirota counseled to the contrary: 
 The Court in Hirota . . . may have found it significant, in considering the nature of the 
tribunal established by General MacArthur, that the Solicitor General expressly contended 
that General MacArthur, as pertinent, was not subject to United States authority.  The facts 
suggesting that the tribunal in Hirota was subject to an “unbroken” United States chain of 
command were not among the “foregoing circumstances” cited in the per curiam opinion 
disposing of the case . . . .  Indeed, arguing before this Court, Solicitor General Perlman 
stated that General MacArthur did not serve “under the Joint Chiefs of Staff,” that his duty 
was “to obey the directives of the Far Eastern Commission and not our War Department,” 
and that “no process that could be issued from this court . . . would have any effect on his 
action.”  Here, in contrast, the Government acknowledges that our military commanders do 
answer to the President. 
 Even if the Government is correct that the international authority at issue in Hirota is 
no different from the international authority at issue here, the present “circumstances” 
differ in another respect.  These cases concern American citizens while Hirota did not, and 
the Court has indicated that habeas jurisdiction can depend on citizenship.  “Under the 
foregoing circumstances,” we decline to extend our holding in Hirota to preclude 
American citizens held overseas by American soldiers subject to a United States chain of 
command from filing habeas petitions.182 
Although the Court reached out to decide the merits (where neither lower court 
had), and held that neither Omar nor Munaf was entitled to relief,183 its jurisdictional 
holding seemed to limit Hirota to all of its unique facts—and on the same day as 
Boumediene comparably limited Eisentrager. 
D. Implications: The “Problem” of Jurisdictional Non-Precedent 
There is an obvious difference, of course, between Hirota and Eisentrager.  The 
decision in the former case was deliberately cryptic and vague as to which of the various 
possible grounds it was based on.  The decision in the latter was almost the opposite—
suggesting first that the courts lacked jurisdiction over any enemy alien held outside the 
territorial United States, and then attempting to explain why these detainees, in 
particular, had no cognizable claim on the merits. 
But the exchanges over Eisentrager in the Supreme Court in Boumediene and over 
                                                                                                                                               
 180. See Geren, 128 S. Ct. 741 (mem.). 
 181. Munaf, 128 S. Ct. at 2215. 
 182. Id. at 2217–18 (citations and footnote omitted).  In a footnote, Chief Justice Roberts noted another 
relevant “circumstance”—the fact that unlike Omar and Munaf, the petitioners in Hirota sought relief as an 
original matter in the Supreme Court.  See id. at 2218 n. 3. 
 183. See id. at 2218–28.  Justice Souter—joined by Justices Ginsburg and Breyer—concurred separately, 
emphasizing the narrowness of the majority’s holding on the merits, and the extent to which the decision would 
not foreclose relief in appropriate future cases, including those where “the probability of torture is well 
documented, even if the Executive fails to acknowledge it.”  Id. at 2228 (Souter, Ginsburg, & Breyer, JJ., 
concurring). 
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Hirota in the lower courts in Omar and Munaf highlight how the cases are perhaps more 
similar than first appears, because in both cases, the majority’s opinion reasonably left 
unclear how significant the factual circumstances actually were.  And that is where Steel 
Co. comes in, because it suggests that courts lack the power to unnecessarily conflate 
jurisdiction with the merits, and must endeavor to stress the basis on which their holding 
rests.  Put another way, Steel Co. serves as a reminder as to what it actually means for a 
rule to be “jurisdictional”—simply put, nothing else should matter once the facts 
necessary to show that a jurisdictional bar applies have been established.  Thus, as I have 
previously suggested with respect to Eisentrager, “if the writ protected by the 
Suspension Clause could not reach noncitizens outside the territorial jurisdiction of the 
United States then the merits should not have mattered.”184 
The significance of Steel Co., then, is not in undermining the viability of pre-Steel 
Co. precedent per se, but in requiring contemporary jurists to resolve the extent to which 
“jurisdictional” dismissals in pre-Steel Co. cases can meaningfully be separated from a 
more specific analysis of the merits.  When such separation is not possible, the earlier 
decision’s vitality as precedent is questionable, at least on even remotely distinguishable 
facts.  One need look no further than the unanimous Court’s treatment of Hirota in 
Munaf for evidence of that point.  And that is the point that I think has been lost on 
commentators post-Steel Co., for these cases really do become “non-precedent,” citable 
as much to support the opposite of their holdings as to support their applicability in 
factually distinguishable cases.  Perhaps, as in Hirota, the original court deliberately 
sought to minimize the precedential effect of their analysis.  Perhaps not.  Either way, if 
Boumediene and Munaf are any guide, we have not even begun to fully appreciate the 
significance to past precedent of the methodological shift that Steel Co. demands. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Although the relationship between Boumediene and Eisentrager is more 
superficially interesting—and more controversial—I was actually motivated to undertake 
this project by Munaf.185  I argued in an earlier article that, notwithstanding the 
deliberately vague language of the Supreme Court’s 1948 decision in Hirota, there was 
no easy or obvious theory on which to distinguish Hirota from the modern cases.186  In 
short, the article assumed that the decision in Hirota must have turned on the Court’s 
construction of some constitutional provision, and none of the likely candidates, I 
reasoned, could meaningfully countenance the types of distinctions that subsequent 
courts and commentators have argued for, including citizenship, formal custody, or the 
existence vel non of a conviction before a foreign or international tribunal.187 
                                                                                                                                               
 184. Vladeck, supra n. 39, at 298. 
 185. As noted above, I co-authored an amicus brief in support of jurisdiction in Munaf that harped on the 
myriad factual distinctions between the Omar and Munaf cases and Hirota.  See Br. for Amici Curiae 
Professors of Constitutional Law and of the Federal Courts in Support of the Habeas Petitioners, Munaf, 128 
S. Ct. 2207.  Many of the ideas in this article were prompted by my work on that brief. 
 186. See Vladeck, supra n. 1. 
 187. See id. at 1498–04 (describing the project).  One thought was that Hirota could be distinguished on the 
narrowest possible ground—i.e., that the defect ran only to the Court’s original jurisdiction.  Even if that were a 
faithful reading of Hirota, though (and I am not sure it is), the D.C. Circuit extended Hirota to the lower courts 
in Flick I, 174 F.2d at 984–86. 
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Thus, in my view, the only way that Hirota could make sense is if it turned on 
propositions that would compel its applicability to most—if not all—of the current cases.  
In other words, I thought the optimal outcome in Munaf would be for the Court to 
overrule Hirota outright, and to thereby vitiate any remaining questions as to how far its 
cryptic holding extends.  That argument, though, presupposes that Hirota was not just 
wrongly reasoned, but wrongly decided.  And on that point, I am not convinced.  Instead, 
I have come to think that Munaf does right by Hirota, and that Steel Co. and the 
methodological shift it heralded help to explain why. 
In a strange way, Eisentrager is the easier case for my thesis, because it is so clear 
from a careful and nuanced reading of Jackson’s opinion that Jackson just was not clear, 
an unusual shortcoming for one of most highly regarded writers in the Court’s history.188  
It is possible, I think, that Justice Scalia may be right—i.e., that Jackson meant to go 
through the merits of the detainees’ claims in Parts III and IV simply to show that a 
categorical jurisdictional rule predicated simply on citizenship and territory would not 
produce unjust results.  But it is equally possible that there was a point to his analysis—
that the merits mattered, at least to him, and the result might have been different where 
the petitioners had a meritorious claim.  Put another way, there is nuance here, even 
when the political atmospherics seem so black and white. 
And that is the significance of Steel Co., for it suggests that we should not assume 
the broader implications of jurisdictional dismissals when narrower constructions are 
available.  More than a rule of convenience, Steel Co. is a rule of necessity, for the Court 
was unyielding in emphasizing that the Article III courts lack the authority to reach the 
merits when the merits do not matter.  The logical inference, then, is that judicial 
discussions of the merits do matter and should be understood as such whenever assessing 
the value and continuing vitality of pre-Steel Co. decisions purporting to articulate 
“jurisdictional” rules. 
                                                                                                                                               
 188. As I alluded to above, Jackson’s papers refute the possibility that we might trace Eisentrager’s lack of 
analytical precision to the other Justices in the majority.  Other than Justice Frankfurter, whose edits did little to 
alter the structure or substance of the draft, and Justice Clark, who offered one minor revision, the other three 
Justices in the majority (Chief Justice Vinson and Justices Reed and Minton) signed onto Jackson’s circulated 
opinion without condition. 
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